NSWI184 – Řízení počítačových sítí Přednáška osmá

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Legacy Technology: IPv4

- ▶ It is like IPv6 (almost) but addresses are 32-bit only
- ▶ Not enough addresses for every machine: needs translation mechanisms
- Addresses: 192.0.2.10 (4 bytes decimal, split by dots)
- ▶ Allocations: at least /24 prefixes, sold on free market
- Exhausted completely (except for AfriNIC)
- Reserved addresses in each network (all-zeros, all-ones)

IPv4 Special Address Ranges

- ► 127.0.0.0/8: loopback
- ► 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16: private use
- ► 100.64.0.0/10: shared use (CGNAT)
- ► 169.254.0.0/16: link-local autoconfig
- ▶ 192.0.2.0/24, 198.51.100.0/24, 203.0.113.0/24: documentation
- ▶ 198.18.0.0/15: benchmarking
- ▶ 192.0.0.0/24: IETF assignments for specific purposes
- ► 224.0.0.0/4: multicast
- ▶ 240.0.0.0/4: reserved for future use
- ▶ 255.255.255.255/32: local broadcast

IPv4 in routing protocols

- ► IPv4 addresses often used as Router IDs
- ► BGP: short form of NLRI

NAT: Network Address Translation

- ▶ "Short-term solution to IP address depletion" (1994, RFC 1631)
- ► Hiding whole networks behind few public IP addresses
- Local nodes use private range addresses for source: src = 10.0.1.2:4567, dst = 192.0.2.42:80
- ► Router translates the source to publicly routable address: src = 203.0.113.75:2345, dst = 192.0.2.42:80
- Router keeps the translation table to back-translate responses
- Local nodes can not be directly contacted from the Internet ... or can be?

NAT Applications


- Customer router
- Operator network (CGNAT)
- ► NAT44 / NAT444
- Virtualized networks in data centers

NAT Variations

- ► RFC 3489, RFC 4787
- NAT vs NAPT
- Static vs dynamic mapping
- Endpoint-independent mapping
- Address-dependent mapping
- ► Address and port-dependent mapping

NAT Hairpinning

- ► Communication between internal nodes through external addresses
- ▶ Router must translate both source and destination



NAT in Linux

- ► Connection tracking based on (proto, SA, SP, DA, DP)
- Prefers keeping port unchanged when free
- /proc/net/nf_conntrack
- /proc/sys/net/nf_conntrack_max

NAT Limitations

- End-to-end connectivity: Breaks direct peer-to-peer communication
- Protocol issues: Problems with protocols embedding IP addresses
- State tracking: Performance and scaling issues of connection tracking
- State persistence: Breaks long-term connections
- Single point of failure: NAT device becomes critical bottleneck
- Layer 4 dependent: Does not work well outside TCP and UDP

NAT Advantages

- ► Fits whole internet into limited IPv4 address space
- Decouples private network from public addressing
- Allows easy switch to backup ISP
- Hides internal network structure
- Prevents easy access from public Internet (but firewall is better)

IPv6 Transition Mechanisms

- ► Dual stack
- ► Translation-based mechanisms
- ► Tunneling-based mechanisms

Dual Stack

- ► IPv4 and IPv6 simultaneously
- Advantages:
 - Simple deployment
 - ► Full compatibility with both protocols
- Disadvantages:
 - Duplication of work
 - ► Hides fails in IPv6 deployment

IPv4/IPv6 Translation

- ► RFC 6144
- ► Stateless translation: SIIT (RFC 6145/7915)
- ► Stateful translation: NAT64 (RFC 6146)
- ▶ DNS translation DNS64 (RFC 6147)
- ► Synthesis: 464XLAT (RFC 6877)

Stateless IP/ICMP Translation

- ► RFC 7915
- Stateless translation between IPv4 and IPv6
- ▶ IPv6-only network connected to IPv4 internet
- Bidirectional communication
- Uses algorithmic address mapping
- Embeds IPv4 address into IPv6 address
- ► Incompatible with SLAAC

NAT64

- ► RFC 6146
- Stateful translation between IPv4 and IPv6
- ► Translation mechanism between IPv6 and IPv4 networks
- Enables IPv6-only clients to access IPv4-only services
- Similar to NAT44 with endpoint-independent mapping
- ► Well-Known Prefix: 64:ff9b::/96 (RFC 6052)

DNS64

- ► RFC 6147
- ► How IPv6-only hosts get IPv6 addresses of IPv4 servers?
- Translation done in DNS name servers with DNS64
- Plenty of problems (DNSSEC, DoH, out-of-control resolvers)
- Only works when server referenced by DNS name

464XLAT

- ► RFC 6877
- Combines stateful NAT64 and stateless NAT46 translation
- Enables IPv4 connections over IPv6-only networks
- Removes need for DNS64
- Widely used in mobile networks transitioning to IPv6
- Supported by mobile phones

464XLAT Architecture

- CLAT (Customer-side Translator)
 - Stateless NAT46 translator on client device
 - Converts IPv4 packets to IPv6 for transport
 - ► Local IPv4 address from 192.0.0.0/29
- PLAT (Provider-side Translator)
 - Stateful NAT64 translator in the network edge
 - ► Handles IPv6 to IPv4 translation for internet
- ▶ Pref64 extension in router advertisements (RFC 8781)

IPv6 Tunneling Mechanisms

- ► Connecting IPv6 networks over IPv4 internet
- ▶ 6in4: Manual tunnel configuration
- ▶ 6to4: Automatic tunneling over IPv4 internet
- ► ISATAP: Intra-site automatic tunnel addressing
- ► Teredo: NAT traversal for IPv6 over IPv4

Dual-Stack Lite

- ► IPv4 connectivity over IPv6-only networks
- Combines tunneling with CGNAT
- ▶ Dual stack in customer network, IPv6-only operator network
- CPE router encapsulates IPv4 traffic and sends it to AFTR
- AFTR decapsulates traffic and does NAT44
- Deployed by ISPs

Lightweight 4over6

- Variant of DS-lite
- Moves NAT from operator network to CPE router
- Subset of ports is provisioned to customer
- ▶ CPE router does NAT44 to that subset of ports
- Encapsulated packets are forwarded to tunnel concentrator
- ► Tunnel concentrator is stateless

Routing IPv4 with IPv6 nexthops

- Next-hop is only needed to get link address
- IPv4 route can have IPv6 next hop
- Support in BGP and Babel
- Nodes do not need IPv4 addresses if they do not originate traffic
- ▶ But they *do* originate traffic: ICMP
- ► Special ICMP origin address: 192.0.0.8

Mutually suspicious

EXTERIOR GATEWAY PROTOCOL (EGP)
Eric C. Rosen
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.
October 1982

It is proposed to establish a standard for Gateway to Gateway procedures that allow the Gateways to be mutually suspicious. This document is a DRAFT for that standard. Your comments are strongly encouraged.

Receiving BGP routes

- It's my responsibility to filter out garbage
- ► Martians:
 - My own routes
 - Private ranges
 - IXP ranges
 - ▶ Non-public-routable ranges . . . e.g. ::/3, 4000::/2, 8000::/1
- ► IRRdb, RPKI/ROA: check origin ASN
- IRRdb, ASPA: check relations in AS Path
- ► Too long prefixes (received /64 is probably an OSPF leak)
- ► Too short prefixes (we are in the Default-Free-Zone)
- lacktriangle Too many prefixes (from a customer / peer) ightarrow set a limit
- Well-known transit ASNs should not be seen in routes from peers and customers
- Bogus ASNs: private ranges, IXP ASNs

Receiving data: Firewall!

- Source address should make some sense.
- Destination address should match routes which I sent.
- Rate limiting.
- Do. Not. Block. ICMP. Please.
- My destinations: Reject unwanted on the ingress.
- Propagate longest possible prefixes to avoid local drops.

Firewall at Linux: nftables

```
table inet meow {
  chain weird-source {
    type filter hook input priority filter policy accept;
  ip saddr { ::/3 } drop;
  }
}
```

Security inside your network

- Any node can go rogue.
- Drop obviously spoofed packets
- ▶ If something should be local, enforce local
- ▶ Drop (and alert?) unwanted routing protocols
- Monitoring (do have some)

Reverse Path Filtering

- Suppose that the sender expects answer.
- Drop packets where we have no route for sender.
- Drop incoming packets on interfaces where we have no route for sender.
- ▶ Strict RPF: Packets may only come from where the best route points to.