# NSWI184 – Řízení počítačových sítí Přednáška šestá

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#### **BGP Path Attributes**

- ► TLV (type, length, value) format
- ► Type consists of flags and type code
- ► Each type only once

#### Attribute Format

#### Attribute Flags (8 bits)

- Optional (O)
- ► Transitive (T)
- Partial (P)
- Extended Length (E)

### Multiprotocol BGP

- ► RFC 4760
- ► MP\_REACH\_NLRI / MP\_UNREACH\_NLRI attributes
- ► Replaces both NLRI and Next Hop attribute
- ► Multiple 'streams' in one BGP session
- Endpoint addresses vs. payload NLRI

#### MP\_REACH\_NLRI Attribute

```
( Attribute header (3 or 4 bytes), O-flag, code 14
| AFI - Address Family Identifier (2 bytes)
| SAFI - Subsequent Address Family Identifier (1 byte)
| Length of Next Hop Address (1 byte)
 -----+
| Next Hop Address (variable)
 ._____
Reserved (1 byte)
  -----+
NLRI - Network Layer Reachability Information (variable)
```

#### MP\_UNREACH\_NLRI Attribute

### IPv6 in Multiprotocol BGP

- ► RFC 2545
- ► NLRI is the same (prefix length, prefix)
- But what about BGP next hop?
- Global-scope IP needed to resolve IGP route
- Link-local IP preferred when used as immediate next hop
- Solution send both!
- Next hop length 16 or 32 bytes
- ► Global-only (IBGP, multihop)
- ► Global + link-local (EBGP, direct)

#### Link-local BGP

- Non-standard extension
- Direct BGP session over link-local addresses
- ▶ No global-scope next hop, only link-local one
- ► Various encodings (LL, ::/LL, LL/LL)

#### **BGP** Route Refresh

- Import policy may reject some routes
- Import policy may change
- ► Need to re-evaluate all received routes
- ► ROUTE-REFRESH message (RFC 2918)
- ► Request for re-transmit of all routes (re-feed)
- Limited to specific AFI/SAFI
- Associated capability

#### **BGP** Enhanced Route Refresh

- Export policy may change, triggering re-feed
- Problem: missing demarcation for re-feed
- Re-feed have to be differential
- ▶ We may want just to send the new state

# BGP Enhanced Route Refresh (continued)

- ► BoRR / EoRR messages (RFC 7313)
- ► Extension of ROUTE-REFRESH message
- Used in the other direction
- BoRR signals begin of re-feed
- EoRR signals end of re-feed
- Routes not mentioned during re-feed are implicitly withdrawn
- Limited to specific AFI/SAFI
- Associated capability

#### **BGP** Graceful Restart

- ► RFC 4724
- ► Maintain forwarding during restart of BGP control plane
- Support negotiated via capabilities
- ► Silent TCP reset → graceful restart
- ▶ NOTIFICATION message  $\rightarrow$  regular restart
- Restarting server keeps data plane (FIB)
- Neighbors keep routes in routing table
- After restart, routers wait for full route exchange
- ▶ End of initial feed marked with End-of-RIB
- ► Timeout in case of something gone wrong

## **BGP Long-Lived Graceful Restart**

- ► RFC 9494
- Extends graceful restart mechanism for longer periods
- ► Applies after regular graceful restart timeout
- Routes are still kept, but marked with LLGR\_STALE community
- Stale routes are depreferenced in best path selection
- Removed after Long lived stale time
- Configured separately for each AFI/SAFI

#### BGP Add-Path

- ► RFC 7911
- Allows BGP speakers to advertise multiple paths for the same prefix
- Path Diversity: multiple backup paths available for faster convergence
- Load Balancing: enables traffic distribution across multiple paths
- Extends NLRI by 32bit Path Identifier to distinguish advertisements
- ▶ Negotiated via BGP capabilities, independent for each direction

## Error Handling - Syntactic Errors

- ► RFC 7606
- Session reset
- ► AFI/SAFI disable
- ► Treat-as-withdraw
- ► Attribute discard

## Error Handling - Semantic Errors

- ► AS path loop
- ► Route reflector loop
- Unresolvable next hop
- ► OTC / role mismatch
- ► Result: Path ineligible
- ► Optional peer-as-check

#### **BGP Limits**

- ► Attribute length: 64k
- Message length: 4k
- Extended message length (RFC 8564): 64k
- ▶ Options (capabilities) in OPEN: 255 bytes
- Extended options (RFC 9072): 64k
- ► But OPEN still max 4k


### Internet Topology

- ▶ Global network of autonomous systems is not arbitrary graph
- It has hierarchical structure, but not simple one
- Many overlapping and interconnected hierarchies
- Transit connectivity connectivity to whole internet

#### Roughly three kinds of relationship between ASes

- Upstream: provides you transit connectivity, provider
- Downstream: you provide them transit connectivity, customer
- Peer: provides you connectivity to them and their downstream, and vice versa

# Example Internet Topology



#### Tier 1 Networks

- ► Top-level ISPs in the internet hierarchy
- ► No upstream providers
- ▶ Settlement-free peering with all other tier 1 networks
- Global backbone infrastructure
- Direct connections to all major internet exchanges

# Internet Exchange Points (IXPs)

- ▶ Infrastructure where multiple networks interconnect
- Replace direct peering links with shared switched network
- Direct BGP sessions between border routers
- Or BGP sessions to route servers

#### Route Servers

- ▶ Replace mesh of BGP sessions in IXP with central point
- ► Facilitate BGP routing exchange between border routers
- Do not forward traffic, only exchange routing information

### Filtering Policy

#### Depends on kind of relationship between ASes

- Upstream: import everything (except your network), export only you and your downstreams
- Downstream: import only expected networks, export everything
- Peer: import only expected networks, export only you and your downstreams

**Route leaks**: Routes exported contrary to the expected relationship, i.e., routes from an upstream or a peer exported to another upstream or peer.

#### **BGP** Roles

- ► RFC 9234
- Formalization of inter-AS relationships
- ► Five defined roles (provider, customer, peer, RS, RS-client)
- Prevents BGP session with mismatched roles
- Prevents route leaks with OTC attribute
- Attached when route is propagated downstream or to a peer
- ▶ Route with OTC attribute can be propagated only to customers

# Internet Routing Registry (IRR) Databases

- Public databases of address ranges and routing policies of ASes
- Source of info which networks to expect from a peer or customer
- ► Routing Policy Specification Language (RFC 2622)
- Unfortunately not fully reliable

# Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

- Problem: Anyone can originate routes regardless of IP allocation
- ▶ RPKI: Resources are cryptographically signed by RIRs
- Chain of trust corresponding to how resources are distributed
- RPKI cache collects and validates resource certificates
- Routers download records from RPKI cache and validate BGP routes
- ► RPKI-RTR protocol (RFC 6810)

# Route Origin Authorizaton (ROA)

- ▶ ROA record: Authorize ASNs to originate routes
- ► (ASN, prefix, max-length)
- Routes validated against these records
- Result of ROA validation used in routing policy
- Prevents accidental leaks of internal routes
- Not bulletproof againts intentional attacks

#### ROA validation

- ► Find ROA records that cover route prefix
- Compare last ASN from AS\_PATH to ROA ASN
- Compare route prefix length to max-length
- lacktriangle Any ROA matches prefix and passes checks ightarrow Valid
- lacktriangle Any ROA matches prefix but fails checks ightarrow Invalid
- No ROA matches prefix → Unknown

## AS Provider Authorizaton (ASPA)

- ► ASPA record: Describe a valid set of AS providers
- ► (ASN, provider-ASN), authorized by ASN
- ► AS\_PATH attribute validated against these records
- Result of ASPA verification used in routing policy
- Should be combined with ROA validation and peer ASN check